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In memory, encoding and retrieval are often conceived of as two separate 
processes. However, there is substantial evidence to suggest that this view is 
wrong—that they are instead highly interdependent processes. One recent 
example is from Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, and Rhodes (2005a), who showed 
that new words presented as foils among a list of old words that had been 
deeply encoded were themselves subsequently better recognized than were new 
words presented as foils among a list of old words that had been shallowly 
encoded. This paradigm, referred to as memory-for-foils, not only demonstrates 
a link between encoding and retrieval, but also has led to a proposal about 
what form this interaction is taking in this task. Jacoby et al. (2005a) proposed 
that people put in place a retrieval mode that leads to a reprocessing of the 
original encoding state, which is incidentally applied across both old and new 
items within the context of a recognition memory test. Such a constrained-
retrieval account suggests an intimate relation between encoding and retrieval 
processes that allows for memories to be highly integrated. 
The goal of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of the 
generalizability and limitations of this memory-for-foils phenomenon and, 
ultimately, to provide more direct evidence for the interaction of these 
processes. Experiments 1 and 2 began by replicating the memory-for-foils 
phenomenon as well as an experiment by Marsh et al. (2009b) which confirmed 
that the phenomenon does not result simply from strength of encoding 
differences. Experiment 3 then substituted a deep vs shallow imagery 
manipulation for the levels-of-processing manipulation, demonstrating that the 
effect is robust and that it generalizes, also occurring with a different type of 
encoding.  Experiment 4 extended the generalizability of the task to factual 
phrases. Experiment 5 then moved on to testing the encoding/retrieval 
interactions by once again employing the imagery encoding manipulation with 
an additional quality judgment in the final recognition memory test. Using the 
remember/know paradigm (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985) demonstrated that 
more highly-detailed memories were associated with foils from the test of deep 
items than with foils from the test of shallow items. 
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From there, response time was used to infer processing speed in 
Experiment 6a, in a test of whether foils tested among deep items incur an 
advantage independent of the manipulation undergone by those items. When a 
lexical decision test replaced the final recognition test, there was no evidence of 
a memory advantage for ―deep‖ foils over ―shallow‖ foils. Finally, Experiment 6b 
provided compelling evidence for context-related encoding during tests of deeply 
encoded words, showing enhanced priming for foils presented among deeply 
encoded targets when participants made the same deep encoding judgments on 
those items as were made on the targets during study.   
Taken together, these findings provide support for the source-
constrained retrieval hypothesis and for the idea of a retrieval mode.  New 
information—information that we may not even be intending to remember— is 
influenced by how surrounding items are encoded and retrieved, as long as the 
surrounding items recruit a coherent mode of processing. This demonstrates a 
clear need to consider encoding and retrieval as highly interactive processes 
and to avoid conceptualizing them as entirely separate entities. This is a crucial 
part of increasing our understanding of the fundamental processes in memory.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 ―…the art of remembering is the art of thinking; and by 
adding… that, when we wish to fix a new thing in either our 
own mind or a pupil's, our conscious effort should not be so 
much to impress and retain it as to connect it with something 
else already there. The connecting is the thinking; and, if we 
attend clearly to the connection, the connected thing will 
certainly be likely to remain within recall.‖   
William James, Talks to Teachers, 1890 
1.1 Background 
Since the earliest research on human memory, investigators 
(Ebbinghaus, 1885) and theoreticians (James, 1890), have sought to categorize 
memory processes into modular subsystems. Breaking processes into their 
subcomponents can make the processes simpler to study and understand. 
However, doing so also leads to a decreased emphasis on how various processes 
work together and may even create illusions of distinctions that do not actually 
exist. One potential false distinction is that between encoding (the laying down 
of new memories) and retrieval (the bringing of past experiences to mind) 
processes. As Hintzman (2011) rightly notes in criticizing how we have studied 
memory, there has been a substantial emphasis on the dissociation between 
these two memory-based processes as being utterly separable when it is clear 
that they are not.  
Evidence for the separability of encoding and retrieval systems comes 
largely from neuroimaging work (e.g., Gabrieli, Brewer, Desmond, & Glover, 
1997; Lepage, Habib, & Tulving, 1998). Early work by Gabrieli et al. (1997) used 
fMRI to compare the patterns of activation for words of previously viewed 
outlines of objects and ones that had not been seen previously. They found a 
region in the anterior medial temporal lobe (i.e., the subiculum portion of the 
hippocampus) to be related to the retrieval of old items, whereas a posterior 
portion of the medial temporal lobe (i.e., the parahippocampal gyrus) to be more 
related to encoding of new words. Based on similar findings using positron 
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emission tomography (PET), Lepage and colleagues (1998) termed this pattern 
of activation the HIPER model (hippocampal encoding/retrieval model). Other 
work focusing on more anterior portions of the brain lead to the conclusion of a 
lateralization of encoding and retrieval processes (Tulving, Kapur, Craik, 
Moscovitch, & Houle, 1994). Based on this research, Tulving et al. (1994) 
postulated the HERA model of memory (hemispheric encoding/retrieval 
asymmetry), in which the left prefrontal cortex (PFC) was associated with 
encoding while the right PFC was associated with retrieval (see also Desgranges, 
Baron, & Eustache, 1998; Düzel, Cabeza, Picton, Yonelinas, Scheich,  Heinze, & 
Tulving, 1999). These theories were built from the conceptualization that 
encoding and retrieval are separate processes. However, modularity cannot be 
assumed based on evidence of separate brain regions for each ―task‖; indeed, 
the regions could work within a network at differing levels for each task where 
one region may play a larger role than the other in their respective tasks but 
both are still necessary. The sheer number of requirements of the brain would, 
perhaps, necessitate all process overlap that is possible, given the limited 
number of structures available. Therefore, it seems unlikely that, since they 
require access to much of the same information that encoding and retrieval 
processes would not overlap. 
Researchers investigating amnesia or aging effects on memory often cite 
either encoding or retrieval as being the principle underlying cause of the 
memory impairments (e.g., Cipolotti, & Bird, 2006; Dannhauser, Shergill, 
Stevens, Lee, Seal, Walker, & Walker, 2008; Mark & Rugg, 1998; Van Damme, 
& d'Ydewalle 2009; Ward 2003). One example of this comes from a 
neuroimaging study in which Ward (2003) was able to demonstrate some 
encoding difficulties in patients with frontal lobe damage by looking at new 
information acquired since injury as compared to information from before the 
injury. Thus, linking a separate encoding mechanism with the frontal lobe. In 
contrast, deficits in Korsakoff‘s syndrome and mild cognitive impairment 
(thought to be a precursor to Alzheimer‘s Disease) have been linked to problems 
in retrieval processes (Van Damme & d'Ydewalle, 2009; Bai, Zhang, Watson, Yu, 
Shi, Yuan, Zang, Zhu, & Qian, 2009). A study focusing instead on encoding and 
retrieval during normal aging using ERP suggested a slowing in neural 
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responses during retrieval (Mark & Rugg, 1998) whereas others point to deficits 
in encoding processes (Cansino, Trejo-Morales, & Hernández-Ramos, 2010). 
While these studies suggest separate encoding and retrieval processes, it is 
impossible to find tasks that isolate a single process (see Jacoby, 1991). The 
‗remaining‘ process is still likely affected in some way, even if it may be hard to 
measure.   
It is important not to investigate encoding and retrieval with the 
conception that they are independent, despite the fact that they can appear to 
be at times. There are hints of their interaction within something as intuitively 
simple as the levels-of-processing framework, in which deeply encoded 
information (i.e., semantically encoded information) is more successfully 
retrieved on a subsequent test than is shallowly encoded information (i.e., 
perceptually-based encoding; Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Semantic encoding, by 
its very nature, requires that information be integrated into personal concepts, 
which requires retrieval and re-storing of past information to succeed (i.e., Is 
the item pleasant or unpleasant?). In contrast, shallow, surface-based, 
encoding requires no such links and allows for only very weak and short-lasting 
memories of the items (i.e., Is there a letter ‗a‘ in the word or not?). If this 
concept is pushed even further by encoding items in a self-referential way, they 
are even better remembered later on—having been completely integrated into 
the pre-existing framework of memory (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977).  
While this analysis provides only a hint of how intertwined encoding and 
retrieval processes are, the transfer appropriate processing principle clearly 
demonstrates their intimate connection (see Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977; 
Roediger, 1990).  This principle states that memory retrieval will be best when 
the processes invoked during retrieval match those undergone during encoding. 
In transfer appropriate processing, even items undergoing poorer encoding 
manipulations are advantaged when a similar task is used at retrieval (Morris et 
al., 1977). Clearly, then, the encoding and retrieval processes are highly 
interdependent. 
This is especially ―front and centre‖ in the proceduralist perspective 
proposed by Kolers (Kolers, 1973; Kolers & Roediger, 1984; for a recent review, 
see Roediger, Gallo, & Geraci, 2002). Kolers argued that distinguishing 
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encoding from retrieval is not really meaningful because every encoding event is 
a retrieval event and every retrieval event is an encoding event. The operations 
applied during a nominal study event, or first encounter with a stimulus 
situation, are reapplied during a nominal retrieval event, or subsequent 
encounter with—or remembering of—that situation.  
Consider a simple everyday illustration. If we are at a grocery store trying 
to recall a grocery list, along with items from the actual list we also retrieve 
other information, such as what we plan to cook for dinner. We are also 
concurrently encoding new information, such as the layout of the store or what 
is on sale. Later on, realizing that we forgot to buy something, we remember 
being at the store, and imagine the aisle where the forgotten item was located. It 
would be unreasonable to label these episodes as purely encoding events or 
purely retrieval events.  Both involve encoding and retrieval. Encoding is simply 
a convenient shorthand for the first processing of an event; retrieval is the 
shorthand for that event‘s subsequent processing. We clearly need to 
understand how encoding and retrieval align as opposed to focusing only on 
how they differ from one another.  This goal is at the core of this thesis. 
1.2 The basic design 
 Building a better conceptualization of how these processes work 
together, has, however, been difficult until recently. Six years ago, though, 
Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, and Rhodes (2005a) reported the development of a 
clever method for examining this very issue (see also Jacoby, Shimizu, 
Velanova, & Rhodes, 2005b; Marsh, Thadeus Meeks, Cook, Clark-Foos, Hicks, 
& Brewer, 2009b). In their study, Jacoby et al. had participants study one set of 
words deeply by judging the pleasantness of each and another set of words 
shallowly by determining whether each word contained a particular letter. In 
the test phase that followed, there were separate recognition tests for these 
deeply and shallowly encoded items, with each set of studied targets mixed with 
a set of unstudied foils. So far, apart from blocking the study and test of the 
deeply and shallowly encoded words, this was essentially a standard levels-of-
processing procedure. The novel part was the addition of a second recognition 
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test phase. Here, the foils from the first recognition test phase became the 
targets, intermixed with a new set of foils. 
Unsurprisingly, the standard levels-of-processing memory benefit of 
deeply encoded items over shallowly encoded items was obtained on the first 
recognition test phase. The focus of the study was what happened on the new 
second recognition test. Intriguingly, the novel (foil) items from the test of 
deeply encoded items were better recognized than their shallow foil 
counterparts. Put simply, there was a levels-of-processing effect on these former 
foils, just as if they had been studied under different orienting tasks. This 
memory benefit was apparent despite the fact that, during the first recognition 
phase, the type of judgment made on those items (i.e., old or new?) was 
equivalent to the type of judgment made on those that did not reveal a 
subsequent memory boost (i.e., the ―shallow‖ foils). Therefore, it could not have 
been the judgment that was directly applied to those items that led to the 
memory enhancement; instead, it must have been a difference in how that 
judgment was made for foils in the test of deep items as compared to those 
within the test of shallow items.  
When one set of items essentially comprises the fillers and that set is 
only there to permit a test of the others—the targets—we should be able to 
easily dismiss them. However, that clearly does not happen, at least not in this 
task. It appears from this task that, during the attempted retrieval of previously 
encountered information, the context of that information is also accessed in 
association with any newly encountered information. To explain this, Jacoby et 
al. (2005a) proposed that, during the initial recognition test, the participants 
constrained their retrieval such that both old and new items were consequently 
processed in the same fashion as the old items had been during their encoding. 
Therefore, in attempting to retrieve information from the past, contextual 
information is used to draw out that information and new information about 
the current retrieval context is concurrently added to the information being 
retrieved. That same contextual information is also being added to the new 
items during encoding. This results in new items from the test of deep items 
also being more deeply processed on the first test and hence being more easily 
recognized during the final memory test than are new items from the test of 
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shallow items. Consequently, retrieval is another occurrence of encoding and, in 
the process, that encoding is linked to information retrieved from the past. 
Does this make sense? Why would an apparently ―extra‖ process be 
performed in addition to the one that is required by a particular task? The 
answer is likely that both the retrieval of old information and the encoding and 
integration of new information are routinely performed together. That is, when 
information is in a retrieval state, it is susceptible and undergoes an updated 
encoding (Hupbach, Gomez, Hardt, & Nadel, 2007). During a recognition 
judgment, it appears that old information is being retrieved and new 
information is being integrated concurrently so that all information being 
judged is then intimately linked and made more easily accessible (within the 
same or a similar context) on subsequent occasions. If participants are able to 
constrain retrieval based on an encoding task (or context) that relates incoming 
information, whether old or new, to the original encoding context, then any item 
recently processed in the same way could more easily be judged as being 
familiar. Additionally, new items should receive that same benefit by being 
processed in the same manner as the old items. This is in line with a study by 
Hupbach, Gomez, and Nadel (2009), which demonstrated that not only are old 
items susceptible during a new encoding event, but it is specifically the memory 
related to their context (i.e., their source) that is reinstated and thus easily 
altered. Of course, this can also cause memory intrusions: When old 
information is available during a new encoding event, that old information can 
be contextually integrated and later misremembered (Hupbach et al., 2007)! 
Therefore, these examples illustrate a ‗flaw‘ in our system that is highly 
suggestive of there being heavily intertwined encoding/retrieval processes.  
It is appropriate at this juncture to introduce the concept of a retrieval 
mode, an idea that Jacoby et al. (2005a) favoured, and that has been suggested 
in the past (e.g., Karpicke & Zaromb, 2010; Koriat, 2000; Nyberg et al., 1995; 
Tulving, 1998).  This is the process of actually going back in time to think of the 
encoding context or to try to reinitiate it somehow. This process is all in an 
effort to reconstruct past information, and this reconstruction is more accurate 
when a specific processing context can be used. Bartlett (1932) showed the 
importance of context in his study of ―The war of the ghosts‖. After reading a 
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passage, participants were asked to recall the passage as accurately as 
possible. He found that recall was not only more coherent but also fit better 
with the participant‘s perspective than the folk tale otherwise would. This study 
clearly demonstrated that (1) memory is a reconstructive process and (2) that 
the participant‘s schema (their personal past) was strongly reflected in the 
resulting memories. It is during the reconstruction of old information that 
memories are most susceptible to encoding new contextual information. Within 
the Jacoby et al. (2005a) paradigm, the idea would be that, during a test, 
participants invoke a type of processing that corresponds to that used during 
study. This fits well with the concept of constrained retrieval and is consistent 
with the proceduralist perspective that encoding and retrieval ordinarily go 
hand in hand. The term ―retrieval mode‖ will be used throughout this thesis. 
1.3 Conceptual Framework 
As already outlined, this thesis grew out of an interest in the idea that 
encoding occurs as a normal component of a retrieval attempt during a 
retention test. The particular focus is on the procedure developed by Jacoby 
and his colleagues (2005a; Marsh et al., 2009b, Jacoby et al., 2005b), which 
will be referred to as the ―memory-for-foils‖ paradigm. Because this paradigm 
appears to establish such encoding during retrieval, albeit indirectly, it is 
potentially an important finding (see Hintzman, 2011). As a result, the question 
of its generalizability and its limitations provided the initial motivation for the 
research reported here.  As this work proceeded, emphasis moved to 
demonstrating that the benefit shown by distractors initially tested among 
deeply processed targets was in fact the result of applying the same processing 
to those distracters as was applied to the targets.  This would confirm that 
encoding was occurring during retrieval on the initial test, and fit with the idea 
of a retrieval mode being in place. 
This thesis began with a careful replication of Jacoby‘s paradigm.  The 
phenomenon, although not large, proved to be robust.  It did appear that a 
retrieval mode was engaged during initial testing, and that instituting this mode 
had observable consequences for new items that occurred in its presence.  Put 
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simply, the retrieval mode also provided a corresponding encoding context, one 
whose influence was readily detectable on a subsequent recognition test. 
But could the observed benefit be due to something other than a retrieval 
mode?  One possibility (also considered by Marsh et al., 2009b) is that the 
stronger items—those that had been deeply processed during study—were 
easier to recognize on the test than were the weaker items, leaving more 
resources to be applied to the distracters during the test of the deeply processed 
items.  The first new experiment tested the possibility that the benefit was 
simply a by-product of having been among strongly encoded items on the initial 
test. Because the levels-of-processing encoding manipulation essentially 
confounds strength and mode of retrieval, either or both could be leading to the 
memory-for-foils benefit found by Jacoby et al. (2005a). To disentangle these 
contributions, instead of using a levels-of-processing encoding manipulation, 
some items were repeated during study to create a ―strong‖ encoding condition 
and these were contrasted with non-repeated study items that constituted a 
―weak‖ encoding condition (see also Marsh et al., 2009b).  
This procedure allowed for strength of encoding to be manipulated in the 
absence of any type of retrieval mode that could be re-entered: It seems 
implausible that repetition alone could establish a mode that could be re-
entered.  Without re-entering and thereby reapplying the initial study 
manipulation to distractors on the initial test, there should be no differential 
memory for foils from the test of strongly encoded items—if constrained 
retrieval indeed underlies the effect. 
Alternatively, if greater strength of the target items at test is enough to 
provide an advantage to the accompanying foils, then foils from the test of 
strong items should show the same benefit as those in the levels-of-processing 
version of the task. In line with the constrained retrieval hypothesis, the 
prediction was that the common benefit of repetition at study would be 
observed, but without any benefit on the final recognition test for distractors 
that had been grouped with stronger items during the initial test. Essentially, 
there would be no mode to re-enter. 
Building from this foundation, the next step was to ascertain the 
generalizability of the memory-for-foils phenomenon. This required changing 
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the initial encoding manipulation to create a different type of mode (or context) 
that could be re-entered during the recognition test. The manipulation chosen 
had previously been used successfully by Hourihan (2008; Hourihan & 
MacLeod, 2011).  It required participants to perform either deep or shallow 
imagery on sets of words. Deep imagery refers to the standard pictorial imagery 
task in which participants form mental images of the referents of words (see 
Paivio, 1971).  The novel task is shallow imagery, where participants form 
mental images of the printed lower case letters in their upper case form. 
Hourihan (2008) demonstrated that this manipulation results in differential 
encoding; for the purpose of this thesis, this manipulation also appeared likely 
to provide modes that could be re-entered. Such re-entry offers the opportunity 
for the original encoding context to be applied to the foils at test, thereby 
leading to a boost in their memory on a subsequent test. The expectation was 
that, if the memory for foils effect is not very narrowly connected only to the 
levels of processing encoding situation, this imagery manipulation should 
provide another demonstration of the memory-for-foils phenomenon. 
A second way of exploring the generalizability of the memory-for-foils 
effect would be to vary not the task but the materials. It is possible that the 
effect is specific to the type of materials used in the test rather than to the 
memory process itself. In this thesis, this was tested by substituting more 
complex stimuli—fact-based statements—for the single words in the original 
experimental method. It is possible that while the effect is found using a 
simplified laboratory-based test of words, it does not translate to more complex 
stimuli such as complete sentences; if so, this would certainly limit its 
generalizability (again, see Hintzman, 2011, for concerns about studying 
memory phenomena using only isolated words). If the effect does hold for 
sentences, however, then it is more likely to have implications for everyday 
memory processes. The expectation was that the retrieval mode benefit would 
be observed even with these more complex materials, thereby supporting the 
hypothesis that the memory-for-foils effect is related to the memory process and 
not restricted to a specific type of materials. 
The fundamental question still remaining about this phenomenon is 
whether direct evidence for mode reinstatement could be found.  Thus far, the 
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findings do not demonstrate that it was in fact the original mode being re-
enacted that was responsible for the benefit.  The thesis addresses this question 
in two ways.  The first way is to assess the quality of memories being attributed 
to the foils from the tests of deeply and shallowly encoded items. That is, is 
there any evidence that a greater quality of memory is associated with the 
―deep‖ foils in a way that would parallel the items that were actually deeply 
encoded? To do so, the imagery-based design was expanded to include 
additional assessments of memory for the foils in the final recognition test. In 
particular, participants were asked to evaluate the perceived quality of the 
memories and to indicate whether each memory was one that was associated 
with additional episodic details (―remember‖), whether the memory had no such 
additional details (―know‖), or finally, whether the item was new (Gardiner, 
1988; Rajaram, 1993; Tulving, 1985; for a similar design in the context of the 
memory-for foils paradigm, see Marsh et al., 2009b). 
If the benefits to the foils from the test of deeply encoded words stem 
from constrained retrieval operations during that initial test, in which 
participants re-enter and therefore reapply the original encoding to all items, 
―deep‖ foils should undergo deep processing and, possibly, ―shallow‖ foils 
should undergo shallow processing on that initial test. The memories for those 
items undergoing a type of incidental ―deep‖ processing should then also be 
associated with additional details related to the encoding question (i.e., the 
pictorial image formed). It is unlikely that any added efficiency can be gained 
through the use of constrained retrieval for the shallowly encoded items. 
Regardless, since the shallow imagery task involves the imaging of a limited 
number of letters, the memory for these items is unlikely to be associated with 
additional details. Therefore, the prediction is that participants should respond 
with a greater proportion of ―remember‖ responses to deep foils as compared to 
shallow foils. Since more ―remember‖ responses mean more detail-based 
memories for those items, and since the memory judgments for the tests of deep 
and shallow items were the same, it is likely that those memory details result 
from processing of items within the original encoding context. This finding 
would thus provide a stronger bridge between source-constrained retrieval and 
the memory-for-foils phenomenon. 
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Evidence for a benefit in the number of ―remember‖ responses when 
encoding and retrieval context match has been previously shown (Gardiner, 
1988; Java, Gregg & Gardiner, 1997; Macken, 2002; Dewhurst & Brandt, 
2007). For example, Macken (2002) demonstrated that when context at retrieval 
(in this case, colour and location of words) was consistent with encoding, the 
number of ―remember‖ responses increased. This was explained as having 
occurred due to a cueing of recollection of item-context associations previously 
formed during encoding (though, see Mulligan & Lozito, 2006). This finding held 
even for a powerful encoding manipulation such as generation (as compared to 
reading words): ―Remember‖ responses were increased when generation is used 
at retrieval (Dewhurst & Brandt, 2007). However, the same was not true for 
read items, possibly indicating that this effect is only maintained with effortful 
processing (and therefore not with the ―shallow‖ condition used in this thesis).  
Consequently, because ―remember‖ responses are increased by using the same 
encoding and retrieval processes, this lends more credence to the suggestion of 
reinstatement of encoding processes (for constrained retrieval) that results in 
the memory-for-foils phenomenon.  
Whether re-enacting the original mode underlies the memory-for-foils 
benefit (i.e., source-constrained retrieval) may be revealed even more clearly 
through examination of response time data.  It is possible that deeply encoded 
items receive preferential processing over their shallow counterparts in a way 
that benefits new items associated with them, such as through speeded 
response times for those new items. Therefore, the second way we tested for a 
direct connection between the reinstatement of the original encoding 
manipulation and the deep foil advantage began by attempting to discount the 
possibility that there is a unilateral benefit to ―deep‖ foils in terms of response 
times.  Toward this end, the final recognition test was replaced with a lexical 
decision task that included both types of foils as well as novel items (nonwords). 
No difference was expected in the speed of performing the lexical decision task 
for the ―deep‖ foils as compared to the ―shallow‖ foils given that lexical decision 
was unrelated to how those items were initially encoded—in fact, both sets of 
items should be similarly primed by their prior exposure. 
 12 
This leads directly to the critical final experiment.  The lexical decision 
task was unrelated to the original depth of processing task at encoding.  If the 
final task was instead closely related to the encoding task used in processing of 
the original items, then according to the retrieval mode account differential 
speed of processing should be observed on that final test. What could be more 
similar to the original encoding task than that very task itself?  As such, in the 
last experiment of this thesis, the final test was altered to be another 
instantiation of the original encoding orientation (i.e., ―Is the item 
pleasant/unpleasant?‖ and ―Does the word contain an ‗a‘/no ‗a‘?‖). These final 
orienting tasks were limited to words that had not received the orienting 
questions originally—the ―deep‖ and ―shallow‖ foils from the recognition test, 
mixed with new items. 
If, indeed, during the initial test, the distractors undergo the same 
processing as was applied to the targets during study as an aid to retrieval (i.e., 
source-constrained retrieval), then participants should be primed to perform 
the same orienting task on the foils more quickly than on the new items 
because the previously processed foils have in essence undergone this task 
before.  Therefore, if participants are faster to respond to the questions 
originally posed concerning targets during the study phase when they are 
applied to the foils during the final test (in particular those from the test of deep 
items), this would provide convincing evidence that these items had previously 
undergone that specific type of processing during their first encounter (i.e., on 
the initial test).  This would constitute strong support for source-constrained 
retrieval underlying the memory-for-foils effect.  
Together, these experiments demonstrate how dramatically retrieval can 
influence encoding, contradicting a purely separate conceptualization of 
encoding and retrieval processes. The principal approach used in this thesis 
involved variations on the experimental design originally created by Jacoby and 
colleagues (2005a), one that cleverly demonstrated an advantage for foils 
initially tested among deeply encoded items as compared to those tested among 
shallow items when they were subsequently tested. Despite only being 
instructed to retrieve old items from memory, participants concurrently (and 
incidentally) encoded new items within the same context as those items being 
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retrieved.  This clearly points to highly integrated encoding and retrieval 
processes.  The interaction between these processes is maintained over a 
variety of situations and with different stimuli, making it likely that this type of 
interaction is one that would be found beyond laboratory settings. 
In terms of an efficient memory system, this encoding-retrieval 
partnership makes a great deal of sense. It is unlikely that one would come 
across new but completely irrelevant information in the context of another set of 
old information. Automatically linking any new information to pre-existing 
information by using the relevant context would make future attempts to access 
that once new information easier. Without such links, all new information 
would potentially be new and difficult to access—―islands‖ of information within 
memory.  Indeed, there is some evidence relating to autobiographical memories 
in amnesics that this may occur (Medved, & Hirst, 2006). Encoding while 
retrieving prevents this isolation. 
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CHAPTER 2: REPLICATIONS 
2.1 Experiment 1:  Replication of Jacoby et al. (2005a) 
Before beginning to address the specific questions about the central 
finding in the Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, and Rhodes (2005a) study, a faithful 
replication was carried out of their Experiment 1, in which the memory-for-foils 
effect was first reported. Jacoby, Shimizu, Velanova, and Rhodes (2005b) had 
previously replicated the phenomenon, as had Marsh et al. (2009b) 
independently, but it was deemed important to be certain that the same basic 
pattern was obtained at the outset in this series of studies.  
2.1.1 Method 
Participants. A total of 24 undergraduate students (20 female, 4 male) 
from the University of Waterloo participated for credit or remuneration ($5). 
Their mean age was 20.9 years (SD=1.5). 
Materials. The stimuli consisted of 247 words, 5–8 letters long, taken 
from the MRC Psycholinguistic online database (www.psy.uwa.edu.au/ 
MRCDataBase/uwa_mrc.htm). The words had an average length of 5.3 letters 
and an average frequency of 37 occurrences per million (Kučera & Francis, 
1967). Words were randomly assigned to six lists of 36 words each, such that 
each participant had a unique assignment of items. Each phase began and 
ended with an additional three-word buffer; these ―buffer‖ words were not 
included in any analyses. In all phases, the words were presented in lowercase 
letters. Two raters rated approximately half (53%) of the items as being 
pleasant. Of course, due to the subjective nature of such a rating task, there 
likely would be high variability in such ratings. Half of the items contained an 
―a,‖ and the remaining half of the items did not. 
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Procedure. A schematic of the experimental procedure is displayed in 
Figure 2.1. All three phases were participant-paced and were identical to those 
of Jacoby et al. (2005a). All stimuli were displayed in white lowercase font on a  
black computer screen. Participants were tested individually and completed the 
entire experiment in approximately 30 min.  
 
Figure 2.1. Experiment 1: Schematic of the procedure. Every participant 
performed the two study sessions, then the two corresponding components of 
Test 1, and then Test 2. 
In the study phase, participants performed two encoding tasks, with 
their order counterbalanced across participants. In the deep encoding task, 36 
words were presented one at a time and participants were to indicate, for each, 
whether it represented something that was pleasant or unpleasant for them. In 
the shallow encoding task, participants viewed a different 36-word list and were 
to indicate whether each contained the letter ―a‖, by pressing 1 for ―a‖, 0 for no 
―a‖ on the keypad. Following the participant‘s keypad response to each word, a 
fixation cross was then presented for 500 ms.  
Next came the first recognition phase, Test 1. On two separate 72-item 
subtests, the 36 deeply encoded words were intermingled with 36 new words, 
and the 36 shallowly encoded words were intermingled with 36 additional new 
words. The order of the two subtests was counterbalanced across participants, 
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who were explicitly informed which list the old items were drawn from (e.g., ―All 
old words are from the list for which you made pleasant/unpleasant decisions‖).  
Participants were asked to press 1 for an old item (target) or 0 for a new item 
(foil) on the numeric keypad. 
Finally, there was the second recognition phase, Test 2. Here, the targets 
were all of the former foils from the first recognition phase—from both the deep 
encoding and shallow encoding recognition tests (i.e., no deeply or shallowly 
encoded items from the study phase were included on Test 2). Intermixed with 
these newly defined targets was a completely new set of previously unseen 
words, such that there were 72 old words (36 ―deep‖ foils and 36 ―shallow‖ foils) 
and 72 new words. Participants were asked to respond either ―old‖ or ―new‖ by 
pressing 1 and 0 on the keyboard, respectively.  
2.1.2 Results and Discussion 
Recognition Test 1.  Participants readily distinguished between old and 
new items from both the deep and shallow encoding tasks (overall hits = .71, 
overall false alarms = .23). A paired-samples t-test was used to compare the 
recognition scores (hits minus false alarms) for words that had been categorized 
deeply versus shallowly during study. A typically robust levels-of-processing  
effect was found, t(23) = 4.24, p <.001. Figure 2.2a presents the hit and false 
alarm rates. Separate paired-sample t-tests for hits and false alarms revealed a 
difference only for the hits, t(23) = 3.76, p = .001 (deep > shallow), and not for 
the false alarms, t(23) = 1.06, p > .20. Clearly, participants were effectively 
using the different encoding techniques during study. 
 Recognition Test 2.  To determine whether there was a levels-of-
processing effect for the foils from Test 1 when they became the targets on Test 
2, a paired-samples t-test was carried out comparing proportions of correct 
responses across word types. As shown in Figure 2.2b, memory was superior 
for foils that had initially been tested among deeply encoded words than for foils 
that had initially been tested among shallowly encoded words, t(23) = 2.48, p < 




Figure 2.2. Experiment 1: Replication of memory-for-foils effect. (a) Recognition 
performance on Test 1, demonstrating the levels-of-processing effect. (b) 
Recognition performance for “old” responses on Test 2, demonstrating the 
memory-for-foils effect. Together, these data provide a complete replication of 
Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, and Rhodes (2005, Experiment 1). Error bars represent 
the standard errors of the corresponding means. 
 
 
Jacoby et al. hypothesized that this memory-for-foils phenomenon was a 
product of constrained memory searches based on the study context. However, 
in the original experiment design, the encoding manipulation confounded 
strength of encoding with mode of encoding, leaving the possibility that the 
phenomenon could result from the differential strength of encoding of the items. 
Therefore, the second replication addressed this potential issue. 
2.2 Experiment 2: Replication of Marsh et al. (2009b, 
Experiment 3) 
 Marsh et al. (2009b, Experiment 3) examined whether the memory-for-
foils effect was a by-product of testing words that had been strongly versus 
weakly encoded during the study phase. In their study phase, words in one list 
had been studied only once each, whereas those in the other list had been 
studied three times each. Repetition is well established as influencing strength 
of encoding (e.g., Hintzman, 1976). Yet it is difficult to imagine how participants 
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could reinstate the number of study presentations as a mode that would 
constrain retrieval, which means that the memory-for-foils effect should not 
occur. That is precisely what Marsh et al. observed. Although done 
independently without knowledge of their experiment, I conducted almost 
exactly the same experiment, and with the same outcome. 
2.2.1 Method 
Participants. A total of 24 undergraduate students from the University 
of Waterloo (13 female, 11 male) participated for credit or remuneration ($5). 
Their mean age was 21.0 years (SD=3.2).  
Materials. The stimulus words were the same as in Experiment 1. 
 Procedure. All three of the phases were participant-paced. Again, words 
were randomly assigned to six lists of 36 words each, with different 
randomizations for each individually tested participant. Three-word primacy 
and recency buffers were, again, not included in any analyses.   
In the study phase, participants studied two 36-word lists—one in which 
items were each presented once, and one in which items were each presented 
three times. For the latter, the entire list was randomized three times, with an 
untested filler word inserted after each of the first two completely randomized 
list presentations to prevent the unlikely possibility of repeating a word on 
consecutive trials. For both lists, each word was presented for 1,500 ms, 
followed by a fixation cross for 500 ms, with no response required. The order of 
studying the two lists was counterbalanced across participants.  
Next came the first recognition phase, Test 1, conducted precisely as in 
Experiment 1, including instructions to participants concerning the source of 
the items (e.g., ―All old items are from the list in which you saw each item only 
one time‖).  
The second recognition phase, Test 2, also was identical to that of 
Experiment 1, with targets again consisting of all of the former foils from the 
first recognition phase—from both the ―triple‖ and the ―single‖ recognition 
tests—among an equal number of new items. Responding was done as on the 
first recognition test. 
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2.2.2 Results and Discussion 
 Recognition Test 1.  Participants readily distinguished old from new 
items for both repeated- and single-presentation lists (overall hits = .74, overall 
false alarms = .08). The data appear in Figure 2.3a. A paired-samples t-test was 
used to compare the recognition scores (hits – false alarms) for words that had 
been studied either once or three times. In line with the extensive repetition 
literature (e.g., Bentin & Moscovitch, 1988; Murnane & Shiffrin, 1991; Ratcliff, 
Clark, & Shiffrin, 1990; Stretch & Wixted, 1998), participants recognized items 
that had been studied three times significantly better than items studied only 
once, t(23) = 5.76, p < .001. Separate t-tests demonstrated that there were (1) 
more hits, t(23) = 5.59, p < .001, and (2) fewer false alarms, t(23) = 2.19, p < 
.05, for words presented three times than for words presented once.   
 Recognition Test 2.  This time, because repetition appeared unlikely to 
be a processing mode that could be reinstated, the prediction was that the 
memory-for-foils effect would not be observed. As shown in Figure 2.3b, there 
was, in fact, no difference in recognition of former foil words as a function of 
whether they were encountered on Test 1 among targets presented once or 
among targets presented three times, t(23) = 0.84, p > .20. Further, the effect 
sizes for this test had quite adequate power to correctly reject the null 
hypothesis (power = .87). This absence of a memory-for-foils effect provides a 
clear replication of the Marsh et al. (2009b, Experiment 3) pattern and is 
consistent with the idea that, for new items to be encoded with the same 
memory benefits as their old counterparts, there must be a coherent mode 
during the initial encoding session that can then be reapplied to items during a 
subsequent retrieval session.  
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Figure 2.3. Experiment 2: Manipulating strength via repetition at encoding. (a) 
Recognition performance on Test 1, demonstrating enhanced recognition for 
words studied three times as opposed to once. (b) Recognition performance for 
“old” responses on Test 2, showing no evidence of a memory-for-foils effect. 
Together, these data provide a complete replication of Marsh et al. (2009b, 






CHAPTER 3: EXTENSION AND GENERALIZATION 
3.1 Experiment 3:  Imagery 
The next experiment was conducted to test the generality of the memory-
for-foils effect by substituting a different encoding-retrieval mode for levels-of-
processing. To accomplish this, I turned to the venerable encoding task of 
visual imagery (see Paivio, 1971, 1995, 2007) and to a variant used by 
Hourihan (2008) in her dissertation. The goal was to create two distinct imagery 
modes. The first was the standard pictorial imagery task, where participants are 
instructed to form a mental picture of the word‘s referent object; this will be 
referred to as ―deep imagery.‖  The second was a case imagery task, where 
participants are instructed to imagine the presented lower case word all in 
upper case; this will be referred to as ―shallow imagery.‖  Naturally, deep 
imagery should result in better memory than shallow imagery, as indeed it did 
in Hourihan‘s dissertation (2008). 
It was expected that these two encoding tasks would form coherent 
processing modes readily invoked again on the separate subtests forming Test 
1.  Consequently, the memory-for-foils pattern observed by Jacoby et al. 
(2005a) and replicated here in Experiment 1 should reappear.  This experiment 
should therefore confirm the robustness and generalizability of the ‗memory-for-
foils‖ phenomenon, specifically testing whether levels-of-processing tasks are 
required during encoding or whether any coherent, reproducible processing 
mode can also produce the effect. 
3.1.1 Method 
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduate students from the University 
of Waterloo (13 female) participated for credit or remuneration ($5). The mean 
age was 20.28 (SD = 1.5). 
Materials.  The stimuli consisted of 247 words 5–8 letters in length 
obtained from the Thorndike and Lorge (1944) norms. The words had an 
average length of 5.7 letters and an average frequency of 22.1 per million. (Note 
that these stimuli were from the MRC database, which provided the additional 
information of word imageability.) All words had moderate to high imageability 
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ratings between 550 and 800. In all phases, the words were presented in 
lowercase letters. Words were randomly assigned to six lists of 36 words each, 
with unique randomizations for each participant. In addition, each phase began 
and ended with three-word ―buffers‖ to discount primacy and recency; these 
words were not included in any analyses. 
Procedure.  Participants were tested individually and completed the task 
in approximately 30 minutes. Apart from the changes in encoding tasks and 
encoding instructions, all procedures were identical to those of Experiment 1. 
In the Study Phase, participants performed a different imagery-based 
categorization task on each of the two study lists. In the ‗deep‘ imagery task, 
participants were asked to form a mental picture representing each item. In the 
‗shallow‘ imagery task, participants were asked to form a mental image of each 
word in capital letters (e.g., for cake: CAKE; Figure 3.1, Panel A). Once a 
participant had created an image, they pressed a key; following this, a fixation 
cross was presented for 500 ms. The order of performance of the imagery tasks 
was counterbalanced across participants.  
Next came the first recognition phase, Test 1, which was nearly identical 
to Experiment 1. On two separate 72-item subtests, the 36 deeply imaged 
words were intermingled with 36 new words, and the 36 shallowly imaged 
words were intermingled with 36 other new words. The order of the two 
subtests was counterbalanced across participants, who were explicitly informed 
which list the old items were drawn from (e.g., ―All old words are from the list 
for which you formed images in your head related to the words‖).  Participants 
were asked to press 1 for an old item (target) or 0 for a new item (foil) on the 
numeric keypad. 
Finally, there was the second recognition phase, Test 2. Here, the targets 
were all of the former foils from the first recognition phase—from both the deep 
imagery and shallow imagery recognition tests (i.e., no deeply or shallowly 
encoded items from the study phase were included on Test 2). Intermixed with 
these newly defined targets was a completely new set of previously unseen 
words, such that there were 72 old words (36 deep-imagery foils and 36 
shallow-imagery foils) and 72 new words. Participants were asked to press 1 for 
an old item (target) or 0 for a new item (foil) on the numeric keypad.  
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3.1.2 Results and Discussion 
Recognition Test 1. Participants were able to recognize the study lists 
very well across imagery condition (overall Hits = 0.77, False alarms = 0.08), as 
shown in Figure 3.1, Panel A. A paired-samples t-test was conducted to 
compare recognition for words that had been imaged pictorially and those that 
had been imaged in capitals. Participants had better memory for pictorially 
imaged as compared to capital-imaged words, t(23) = 4.31, p < 0.001. This was 
true for hits, t(23) = 4.45, p < 0.001, and showed a corresponding trend for false 
alarms—a greater number of false alarms for capital-imaged words than for 
pictorially-imaged words, t(23) = 2.01, p = 0.06 (Figure 3.1, Panel B). Therefore, 
participants were effectively using the different encoding techniques, resulting 
in better encoding for words imaged as pictures than for words imaged in upper 
case.  
Recognition Test 2.  A paired-samples t-test demonstrated an effect of 
type of processing, with better memory for old ―pictorial‖ foils than for old 
―capital‖ foils, t(23) = 3.48, p < 0.005. In line with the levels of processing 
finding in Jacoby et al. (2005a) and in  Experiment 1 reported here, there were 
more hits for foils that had been initially viewed during the test for words 
imaged pictorially than for foils that had been initially viewed during the test for 
words imaged as capitals (Figure 3.1, Panel C).  
Thus, a different encoding task than the only one that has previously 
been used also produced the ‗memory for foils‘ effect.  Participants 
demonstrated enhanced subsequent recognition for new words tested among 
words that had been imaged pictorially as compared to new words tested among 
words that had been imaged in upper case. This deep/shallow imagery 
manipulation is therefore quite analogous to the deep/shallow levels of 
processing manipulation.  These data demonstrate that using an imagery-based 
encoding technique provides the same pattern of results as seen in a typical 
levels of processing study. Clearly, what is important is that the mode of 
encoding is sufficiently coherent that it can be re-enacted at the time of 
retrieval. This mode at retrieval then ―spills over‖ onto the foils, producing an 
encoding benefit for those accompanying items deeply encoded in the preceding 
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Figure 3.1. Experiment 3: Manipulating type of imagery at encoding. (a) Outline of 
the procedure. (b) Recognition data from Test 1, demonstrating enhanced memory 
following pictorial imagery as compared to capital letter imagery. (c) Recognition 
performance for Test 1 foils on Test 2, demonstrating a clear memory-for-foils 
effect. Error bars represent the standard errors of the corresponding means. 
 
study phase. This finding supports the source-constrained retrieval hypothesis 
of Jacoby et al., demonstrating its generalizability. 
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3.2 Experiment 4:  Phrases 
The preceding experiment generalized the memory-for-foils paradigm to a 
different encoding task. To further investigate the generalizability of the 
paradigm, the materials were altered: Phrases were substituted for the words of 
the standard Jacoby et al. (2005a) paradigm. This also permitted a test of 
whether the phenomenon would hold for more complex stimuli and therefore be 
more applicable beyond the laboratory setting.  
3.2.1 Method 
Participants. A total of 24 undergraduate students from the University 
of Waterloo (18 female, 6 male) participated for credit or remuneration ($5). 
Their mean age was 20.8 years (SD = 2.4). 
Materials. The 247 stimulus phrases were gathered from various 
sources, being selected from internet sources to be similar to those of Gopie and 
Macleod (2009). The phrases ranged from 3 to 13 words in length. All phrases 
contained unusual facts. See appendix A for examples. 
Procedure. Phrases were randomly assigned to six lists of 36 phrases 
each, with different randomizations for each individually tested participant. 
Again, three-phrase primacy and recency buffers were not included in any 
analyses. Participants were tested individually and completed the entire 
experiment in approximately 30 min. 
In the study phase, participants performed two encoding tasks, with 
their order counterbalanced across participants. In the deep encoding task, 36 
phrases were presented one at a time and participants were to indicate, for 
each, whether it was believable or unbelievable. In the shallow encoding task, 
participants viewed a different 36-phrase list and were to indicate whether each 
contained seven or fewer words or greater than seven words. Participants were 
given 2,500 ms in which to complete their responses.  
The next two phases were identical to Experiment 1 with the exception 
that, instead of words, phrases were used as stimuli. During the first 
recognition phase, Test 1, participants completed two separate 72-item 
subtests: one in which 36 deeply encoded phrases were intermingled with 36 
new phrases, and another in which 36 shallowly encoded phrases were 
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intermingled with 36 additional new phrases. The order of the two subtests was 
counterbalanced across participants, who were explicitly informed which list 
the old items were drawn from (e.g., ―All old words are from the list for which 
you made believability decisions‖).  Participants were asked to press 1 for an old 
item (target) or 0 for a new item (foil) on the numeric keypad. 
The final recognition phase, Test 2, was identical to that in Experiment 1 
with the substitution of phrases in place of words.  
3.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Recognition Test 1.  Participants readily distinguished between old and 
new items from both the deep and shallow encoding tasks (overall hits = .65, 
overall false alarms = .09). A paired-samples t-test was used to compare the 
recognition scores (hits minus false alarms) for phrases that had been 
categorized deeply versus those that had been categorized shallowly during 
study. A typically robust levels-of-processing effect was found, t(23) =  13.83, p 
< .001. Figure 3.2a presents the hit and false alarm rates. Separate paired-
sample t-tests for hits and false alarms revealed a difference for the hits, t(23) = 
12.42, p < .001, and also for the false alarms, t(23) = 2.88, p <.005. Clearly, 
participants were effectively using the different encoding techniques during 
study.  
Recognition Test 2. To determine whether there was a levels-of-
processing effect for the foils from Test 1 when they became the targets on Test 
2, a paired-samples t-test was conducted comparing proportions of correct 
responses across word types. As shown in Figure 3.2b, memory was superior 
for foils that had initially been tested among deeply encoded phrases than for 
foils initially tested among shallowly encoded phrases, t(23) = 4.38, p < .001.   
Thus, a different type of stimuli than those previously used also 
produced the memory-for-foils effect. Participants demonstrated enhanced 
subsequent recognition for new phrases tested among phrases that had been 
deeply encoded as compared to new phrases previously tested among shallowly 
encoded phrases. That the memory-for-foils effect is maintained with a more 
complex type of stimulus clearly demonstrates that the effect is quite robust 
despite the added complexity. When the stimuli are tested within the context of  
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Figure 3.2. Experiment 4:  Manipulating type of stimulus at encoding. (a) 
Recognition data from Test 1, demonstrating enhanced memory following deep 
encoding of phrases as compared to shallow encoding of phrases. (b) Recognition 
performance for Test 1 foils on Test 2, demonstrating a clear memory-for-foils 
effect. Error bars represent the standard errors of the corresponding means. 
 
deep or shallow encoding, the ―deep‖ foils again receive the benefits of the ―spill 
over‖ from the items that truly did experience a deep encoding. This finding 
supports the source-constrained retrieval hypothesis of Jacoby et al. (2005a), 
and additionally demonstrates and expands upon the generalizability of the 
phenomenon. Further, this provides a basis for potential applicability of this 
phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER 4: LINKING ENCODING AND RETRIEVAL 
4.1 Experiment 5: Imagery with “Remember/Know” 
Judgments 
After establishing the generalizability of the memory-for-foils effect, a 
fundamental question remained. Thus far, there has been no direct evidence for 
mode reinstatement in any of the reported studies (Jacoby et al., 2005a; Jacoby 
et al., 2005b; Marsh et al., 2009b) or in any of the previous studies in this 
thesis. Although better recognition of foils that accompany deeply processed 
targets is consistent with deeper processing of those foils, which in turn is 
consistent with a deeper mode of processing, that logic is indirect. Therefore, 
the following studies were designed to address this question.  
To start, Experiment 3 of the thesis was modified to include a quality of 
memory-for-foils so as to further link those memories with a constrained 
retrieval approach. Stemming from neuropsychological and imaging data (e.g., 
Aggleton, McMackin, Carpenter, Hornak, Kapur, Halpin, Wiles, Kamel, 
Brennan, Carton, & Gaffan, 2000; Curran, 2000; Düzel, Yonelinas, Mangun, 
Heinze, & Tulving, 1997, Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998), 
recognition memory tests actually appear to draw from two separate sources of 
memory: one that is based on conscious recollection of the encoding event or 
aspects of it, and the other that is limited to a memory that contains only the 
familiarity of the old item (Gardiner, 1988). One way to obtain a subjective 
indication for whether each memory is recollective (i.e., detail-rich) or 
familiarity-based is through the use of the Remember/Know paradigm (Tulving, 
1985; for a review see Yonelinas, 2002).  In this paradigm, participants are 
asked, within the context of a recognition test, to reflect on the qualitative 
nature of their memories. For detail-rich, recollective memories, they are asked 
to provide a ―remember‖ response, and for detail-poor memories they are to 
provide a ―know‖ response.  
An analysis of the qualitative nature of the memory-for-foils effect can 
provide additional support for the constrained retrieval hypothesis. If the initial 
encoding manipulation is re-instituted on foils during the first recognition test, 
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more ―remember‖ responses would be linked to recognition associated with 
greater detail, which would be expected for foil words from the deep imagery 
test (similar to the findings of Marsh et al., 2009b, Experiment 1). For the 
detail-poor ―shallow‖ foils, there should be fewer ―remember‖ responses. This 
experiment represents a conceptual replication of Experiment 3 in which a 
remember/know judgment was included in the final recognition test.    
4.1.1 Method 
Participants. A total of 25 undergraduate students from the University 
of Waterloo (21 female, 4 male) participated for credit or remuneration ($5). 
After one female participant was removed for failing to comply with instructions 
on the final test, the mean age was 20.3 years (SD=3.3). 
Materials. The stimuli were identical to those in Experiment 1. 
Procedure. All three phases were participant-paced. Participants were 
tested individually and completed the entire experiment in approximately 30 
min. Testing parameters were identical to those in Experiment 3.  
The study phase and the first recognition phase, Test 1, were identical to 
Experiment 3. 
Finally, there was the second recognition phase, Test 2. Here, the targets 
were all of the former foils from the first recognition phase—from both the deep 
imagery and shallow imagery recognition tests (i.e., no deeply or shallowly 
encoded items from the study phase were included on Test 2). Intermixed with 
these newly defined targets was a completely new set of previously unseen 
words, such that there were 72 old words (36 deep-imagery foils and 36 
shallow-imagery foils) and 72 new words. Participants were asked to respond 
based on the quality of their memories, saying either ―remember.‖ ―know,‖ or 
―new.‖ They were given very careful instruction and practice on deciding 
whether the words were new, or were old and accompanied by detailed 
memories (i.e., ―remember‖ response), or were old and not accompanied by any 
detailed memories (i.e., ―know‖ response). The instructions closely followed 




4.1.2 Results and Discussion 
Recognition Test 1.  Participants were able to recognize the study lists 
very well across imagery conditions (overall hits = .78, overall false alarms = 
.11), as is shown in Figure 4.1a. A paired-samples t-test demonstrated that 
participants had considerably better overall memory for pictorially imaged 
words than for words imaged in capitals, t(23) = 6.74, p < .001. This was true 
for hits, t(23) = 7.44, p < .001, and showed a complementary pattern for false 
alarms—more false alarms for capital-imaged than for pictorially imaged words, 
t(23) = 2.19, p < .05. Therefore, participants were effectively using the different 
encoding techniques, resulting in better encoding for words imaged as pictures 
than for words imaged in uppercase. 
 Recognition Test 2.  Most important, a paired-samples t-test 
demonstrated a significant effect of type of imagery, with better memory for old  
 
 
Figure 4.1.  Experiment 5. Manipulating type of encoding and inclusion of a 
quality of memory assessment. (a) Recognition data from Test 1, demonstrating 
enhanced memory following pictorial imagery as compared to capital-letter 
imagery. (b) Recognition performance for Test 1 foils on Test 2, demonstrating a 
clear memory-for-foils effect. Error bars represent the standard errors of the 
corresponding means. 
 
pictorial foils than for old capital foils, t(23) = 3.41, p < .005. Thus, the memory-
for-foils effect, as generalized to an entirely different form of encoding 
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manipulation, replicated. In line with the levels-of-processing finding in Jacoby 
et al. (2005a), there were more hits for foils that had initially been pictorially 
imaged during the first test than for foils that had initially been imaged as 
capitals (Figure 4.1b). The pattern perfectly replicated that of Experiment 3. 
The critical new data are the quality of memory judgments—―remember‖ 
vs ―know‖ response.  A two-way ANOVA of the ―remember‖ responses showed a 
significant interaction, F(1,23) = 12.55, MSE = .007, p < .005, η2p = 0.353. There 
was a significant main effect of item depth of processing, F(1, 23) = 10.27, MSE 
= .004, p < .005, η2p = .309, but no effect of response type, F(1,23) = 1.65, MSE 
= .053, p > .20, η2p = .067. Subsequent tests demonstrated significantly more 
―remember‖ responses to words from the test of deeply imaged items as 
compared to shallowly imaged items, F(1, 23) = 31.36, MSE = .004, p < .001, η2p 
= 0.577. In sharp contrast, there was no significant levels-of-processing effect 
for items given ―know‖ responses, F < 1. These remember/know data are shown 
in Table 4.1. When the independent remember/know procedure (Yonelinas, 
2002) was applied to the ―know‖ responses, the contribution of these responses 
was higher overall (.35 and .34 for ―deep‖ and ―shallow‖ foils, respectively), but 
did not differ across foil types.  
Therefore, Experiment 5 was able to build upon the previous findings 
that the memory-for-foils effect is robust and generalizable. In addition, this 
experiment confirmed that deep foils make up a higher proportion of 
―remember‖ responses than do shallow foils, consistent with Marsh et al. 
(2009b). This suggests that an increase in detail is associated with the foils 
from the test of deeply encoded words relative to those from the test of shallowly 
encoded words. This is further supported by research by Gallo, Meadow, 
Johnson, and Foster (2008), who demonstrated that typical levels-of-processing 
effects are based on recollective distinctiveness from the extra details that are 
available for items due to deep encoding. The present argument is that such 
detail is related to imagery of the items as a consequence of reentry into the 
picture imagery encoding mode. 
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Table 4.1. Proportions of hits assigned “Remember” and “Know” responses 
following imagery-based processing 
Response Type Deep Foils Shallow Foils 
―remember‖ .27 .17 




4.2 Experiment 6a: Lexical Decision 
The results of Experiment 5 provide some convincing support for the 
source-constrained retrieval explanation of the memory-for-foils effect. But one 
might still ask whether foils on a test of deeply encoded items show an overall 
efficiency of processing that is simply a byproduct of more efficient processing 
of their deep counterparts. That is, could something about deep processing 
other than the creation of a mode that can be re-enacted be driving the 
memory-for-foils effect?  To ensure that some sort of general advantage is not 
the source of the benefit, Experiment 6a substituted a lexical decision task for 
the deep/shallow processing tasks in the final phase. 
If foils from the test of deeply encoded items have a general processing 
advantage relative to those from the test of shallowly encoded items, then this 
should be apparent on almost any memory measure. In the case of lexical 
decision, then, word decisions should be faster for the deep foils as compared to 
the shallow foils. However, if deep foils were processed under the same 
encoding mode as their target counterparts, and it is re-entry into this mode 
that underlies the effect, then there should be no such benefit on the lexical 
decision task because it is unrelated to that deep encoding. 
4.2.1 Method 
Participants. A total of 26 undergraduate students from the University 
of Waterloo (17 female, 9 male) participated for credit. Their mean age was 20.1 
years (SD=1.67). Four of the participants were removed from all analyses due to 
performing in the final phase more than two standard deviations slower than 
the mean response time for that phase. 
Materials. The stimulus words were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1. Nonwords were compiled using the ARC nonword database 
(www.maccs.mq.edu.au/~nwdb/nwdb.html; Rastle, Harrington, & Coltheart, 
2002). Nonwords were 4–8 letters long and matched with the words on letter 
length frequency. 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually and completed the 
entire experiment in approximately 30min. Words were randomly assigned to 
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four new lists of 36 words each for each participant. Similarly, nonwords were 
randomly assigned to two lists of the same size. In addition, each task began 
and ended with an additional three words (or nonwords) to minimize primacy 
and recency effects; these buffer items were not included in any analyses. The 
order of the tasks within each of the phases was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
In the study phase, participants performed deep- and shallow-encoding 
tasks on separate word lists, identical to the procedure used in Experiment 1.  
In the recognition phase (Test 1), participants performed the test 
precisely as in Experiments 1. 
In the judgment phase (Test 2), participants performed a lexical decision 
task (i.e., ―Is the item a word?‖). The items on this test consisted of half of the 
foil items from each of the recognition test lists (18 from the test of deeply 
encoded items and 18 from the test of shallowly encoded items), intermingled 
with an equal number of nonwords (72 items in total). To parallel as closely as 
possible the procedure of Experiment 2, this task was repeated in exactly the 
same way, with the remaining words from the deep and shallow test lists and a 
new set of nonwords. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and as 
accurately as they could by pressing 1 or 0 on the keyboard. Because there 
were no methodological differences between the two lexical decision blocks, the 
data were combined prior to analysis. 
4.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Recognition test. As before, participants performed well on the 
recognition test of the initially studied lists (overall hits = .76) and readily 
discriminated these studied words from new words (overall false alarms = .13). 
These results are displayed in Figure 4.2a. A paired-samples t-test showed that 
participants had better overall memory for deeply encoded as compared to 
shallowly encoded words, t(21) = 10.66, p < .001. This was true for hits, t(21) = 
12.60, p < .001, and showed a mirror effect for false alarms—a greater number 
of false alarms for shallowly than for deeply encoded words, t(21) = 2.71, p < 
.01. Therefore, participants were effectively using the two encoding techniques, 
resulting in the typical levels-of-processing effect reported by Jacoby et al. 
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(2005a) and by Marsh et al. (2009b), and seen in the previous experiments in 
this thesis. 
 
Figure 4.2.  Experiment 6a: Manipulating type of decision at test. (a) Recognition 
data from Test 1, demonstrating enhanced memory following deep encoding as 
compared to shallow encoding. (b) Reaction time data for Test1 foils on the lexical 
decision task, demonstrating no significant difference for “deep” and “shallow” 
foils. Error bars represent the standard errors of the corresponding means. 
 
Lexical decision judgment task. Following one-way ANOVAs, planned 
contrasts were conducted on the means of the participant median response 
times for the lexical decision task, which formed the final phase of the 
experiment. Two contrasts were performed, the first examining priming for the 
previously seen foils and the second examining whether priming differed 
between the two types of previously seen foils. There was a significant main 
effect across the three conditions—deep foils, shallow foils, and new nonwords, 
F(2, 42) = 11.80, MSE = 885.8, p < .001, η2p = .360. The first contrast 
demonstrated the routine finding that old words were responded to more 
quickly than new nonwords, F(1, 21) = 12.77, MSE = 9,672.6, p < .01, η2p = 
.378. As expected, the second planned contrast resulted in no difference 
between foils from the test of deeply encoded words and foils from the test of 
shallowly encoded words, F(1, 21) = 2.00, MSE = 318.9, p = .17, η2p = .087; see 
Figure 4.2b. Indeed, the observed difference was in the wrong direction, with 
respect to the hypothesis that deep items should always outperform shallow 
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items. Therefore, foils first encountered among deeply encoded words did not 
incur any benefit over those first encountered among shallowly encoded items 
on a measure unrelated to the retrieval mode under which they were thought to 
be processed.  
In sum, words that had been experienced as foils among target words 
that had been deeply processed at study were not responded to any faster on a 
subsequent judgment task that did not require the same deep processing. 
Evidently, if the processing is not the same as during the initial encounter with 
a word and on the final judgment task, deeply encoded items do not accrue a 
benefit. Therefore, there is no evidence for some form of general benefit for 
items processed within a deep context. Based on the constrained retrieval idea 
and the concept of response mode, the hypothesis offered here is that the 
benefit for the deep foils should be specific to the judgment that was during the 
study phase, entirely consistent with those foil items having been processed in 
the same way as their target counterparts. This was tested in the final 
experiment of the thesis.  
4.3 Experiment 6b: Speeded Judgment 
The final experiment was designed with the goal of providing a more 
direct index of processing mode reinstatement at the time of test. The reasoning 
was that having prior experience at processing an item in a particular way (or in 
a particular context) should promote faster processing of that same item within 
that same context as compared to within a different context. Such encoding 
specificity should, then, be evident only on a test that is highly related to the 
original mode of study. 
To test this idea, Experiment 6b returned to the typical levels-of-
processing study manipulation (i.e., pleasant/unpleasant and ―a‖/no ―a‖ 
decisions), for optimal connection to the previous literature. But critically, the 
final test was changed. In place of the usual recognition test of former foils—
Test 2—another speeded judgment test was substituted. This time, the 
judgment involved repetition of the initial encoding question from the study 
phase, but carried out now on the foil items from Test 1. Half of the foils from 
the test of deep items and half of the foils from the test of shallow items were 
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presented together with new items for a pleasantness judgment; the same was 
done for the letter ―a‖ judgment. The prediction was that if the foils that had 
accompanied deep targets had been processed deeply (i.e., for pleasantness), 
whereas the foils that had accompanied shallow targets had not been processed 
deeply, then only the deep foils would be faster for participants to judge on the 
pleasantness judgment task, because only they had effectively already been 
processed deeply in terms of their pleasantness. Participants were not informed 
that some test item on this pleasantness judgment task would be old and some 
would be new, so effectively this was an indirect test, unlike the direct 
recognition test previously used.  
If the memory-for-foils effect were a consequence simply of the former 
foils having been associated with deeply encoded items, it is unlikely that those 
items would be faster on a subsequent speeded performance test involving the 
original deep-encoding question. If, however, the deep foil items underwent 
processing within the same context as their old counterparts during Test 1, 
then these former foils should be faster to process with respect to pleasantness 
(the basis of the original deep judgment) than should the shallowly encoded 
items.  
I did not expect a complementary benefit on the shallow judgment task 
favoring foils that had accompanied shallowly encoded items on the first test 
because of their relatively weak encoding, and also because I suspected that 
shallow encoding would not have been sufficient to produce a unique encoding 
mode that could be successfully reinstated. Nevertheless, to test the alternative 
hypothesis that accompanying deeply processed items on a prior test always 
leads to improved memory for foils, I did examine this context by having half of 
the deep and shallow foils appear on a ―contains the letter a‖ judgment task.  
4.3.1 Method 
Participants. A total of 41 undergraduate students from the University 
of Waterloo (24 female, 17 male) participated for credit or remuneration ($5). 
The mean age was 20.8 years (SD = 3.3). The data of 3 participants were 
discarded from all analyses due to performing more than two standard 
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deviations slower in the final phase than the mean response time performance 
for that phase. 
Materials. The stimulus words were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1.  
Procedure. Participants were tested individually and completed the 
entire experiment in approximately 30 min. Words were randomly assigned to 
six new lists of 36 words each for each participant. In addition, each task began 
and ended with an additional three words to minimize primacy and recency 
effects; these words were not included in any analyses. The order of the tasks 
within each of the phases was counterbalanced across participants. 
The study and recognition phases were identical to Experiment 1. 
In the judgment phase, there were two subtasks: pleasantness judgment 
and letter ―a‖ judgment, which were counterbalanced across participants. For 
pleasantness judgment, participants repeated the original deep-encoding 
question used at study (―Is the item pleasant or unpleasant?‖) for half of the foil 
items from each of the recognition test lists (18 from the test of deeply encoded 
items and 18 from the test of shallowly encoded items) intermingled with 36 
new items (72 words in total). The remaining deep and shallow foil items from 
the first recognition phase were mixed with another set of new items, and for 
these participants responded to the same shallow-encoding question used 
during study (―Does the word contain an ‗a‘ or no ‗a‘?‖). Thus, both ―deep‖ and 
―shallow‖ foils were tested with each judgment task such that half of the foils 
were aligned in terms of the context of their recognition judgment, and half 
were not. Additional instructions requested that participants respond as quickly 
as possible while performing as accurately as they could. As before, they 
responded by pressing 1 or 0 on the keyboard. Participants were never 
instructed as to the nature of the words; that is, they were never told that old 
words would be appearing among the items during these decision tasks. 
4.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Recognition test. Participants performed well on the recognition test of 
the initially studied lists (overall hits = .75) and readily discriminated these 
studied words from new words (overall false alarms = .21). These results are 
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displayed in Figure 4.3a. A paired-samples t-test showed that participants had 
better overall memory for deeply encoded as compared to shallowly encoded 
words, t(37) = 10.91, p < .001. This was true for hits, t(37) = 8.86, p < .001, and 
showed a mirror effect for false alarms—a greater number of false alarms for 
shallowly than for deeply encoded words, t(37) = 4.31, p < .001. Therefore, 
participants were effectively using the two encoding techniques, resulting in the 
typical levels-of-processing effect reported by Jacoby et al. (2005a) and by 
Marsh et al. (2009b), and also replicated Experiment 1 in this thesis. 
Judgment task. Following one-way ANOVAs, planned contrasts were 
conducted on the means of the participant median response times for each of 
the judgment tasks, which together formed the final phase of the experiment. 
For each judgment task, there were two contrasts, the first examining priming 
for the previously seen foils, and the second examining whether priming differed 
between the two types of previously seen foils.  
Shallow judgment task. On the shallow judgment task, the three 
conditions—deep foils, shallow foils, and new words—did not differ from each 
other, F < 1. Not surprisingly, therefore, neither planned comparison was 
significant, both Fs < 1 (for shallow vs deep; Figure 4.3b). Therefore, priming 
did not occur either overall, for old versus new words, or differentially, for 
shallow versus deep test foils. I suspect that the processing carried out in 
judging whether words contain the letter ―a‖ is so limited that participants 
cannot benefit from reinstating the vowel-based shallow mode, if indeed there 
actually is such a mode. This condition was included just for completeness, as I 
did not expect any differential priming of items from the different test lists. 
Deep judgment task  The task of principal interest was the deep 
judgment task, since the findings of Jacoby et al. (2005a) and Marsh et al. 
(2009b) had suggested that this mode of processing can be reinstated. If the 
foils presented among deep targets on the recognition test were processed like 
the deep targets had been during study (i.e., for pleasantness), this should 
result in more priming of that same judgment for the deep foils relative to the 
shallow foils. There was a significant main effect across the three conditions—
deep foils, shallow foils, and new words, F(2, 74) = 7.46, MSE =1,666.4, p < 




Figure 4.3. Experiment 6b: Manipulating type of decision at test. (a) Recognition 
data from Test 1, demonstrating enhanced memory following deep encoding as 
compared to shallow encoding. (b) Reaction time data for Test 1 foils on the 
shallow decision task demonstrating no significant difference for “deep” and 
“shallow” foils. (c) Reaction time data for Test 1 foils on the deep decision task, 
demonstrating a “deep” foil advantage over “shallow” foils. Error bars represent 
the standard errors of the corresponding means. 
 
responded to more quickly than new words, F(1, 37) = 13.0, MSE = 7,410.9, p < 
.001, η2p =.260. The second planned contrast was the crucial test and did 
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indeed demonstrate that participants were faster at making the pleasantness 
judgment for the foils from the test of deeply encoded words than for the foils 
from the test of shallowly encoded words, F(1, 37) = 4.11, MSE = 4,195.2, p < 
.05, η2p = .100; see Figure 4.3c.  
In sum, words that had been experienced as foils among target words 
that had been deeply processed at study benefited on a subsequent judgment 
task that required the same deep processing. This was not simply general 
priming from prior experience, because words experienced as foils among target 
words that had been shallowly processed at study showed reliably less priming. 
Contrasting Experiments 6a and 6b demonstrates that the benefit for the deep 
foils was specific, consistent with these items having been processed in the 
same way as their target counterparts. This provides direct evidence in support 
of the idea of source-constrained retrieval because, for such a benefit to occur, 
the words would have to have been associated with that relevant type of 
processing in a prior encounter—through re-entry into the encoding context 
during the prior recognition test. 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Encoding and retrieval processes are often conceptualized as being 
separate entities. However, transfer appropriate processing and, more recently, 
the memory-for-foils phenomenon, would suggest otherwise. Indeed, Hintzman 
(2011) dubs this ―process-pure‖ assumption with respect to encoding/retrieval 
one of the prevalent fallacies in the study of memory. The main tenet of this 
thesis is that these processes are, instead, part of one overarching process. 
While encoding may be about the laying down of new memories and retrieval 
about the recovery of old ones, it is inescapable that the encoding and retrieval 
of memories are intimately linked. For them to be linked, any encoding is done 
within the context of prior memories and is therefore another retrieval episode; 
any retrieval done within the context of new experiences is therefore another 
encoding episode. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate one way in 
which this occurs.   
5.1 Summary of research findings 
Jacoby et al. (2005a; see also Jacoby et al., 2005b; Marsh et al., 2009b; 
Shimizu & Jacoby, 2005) demonstrated that the way in which targets are 
processed on a recognition test can influence subsequent memory for the 
accompanying distractors.  Specifically, distractor words that had appeared 
among target words that had been semantically encoded during an initial study 
phase were subsequently better recognized than distractor words that had 
appeared among targets that had been encoded non-semantically during initial 
study.  Experiment 1 of this thesis reports a faithful replication of this basic 
finding. We also know from the work of Marsh et al. (2009b) that this effect is 
not simply the consequence of differential strength of encoding, as they showed 
by manipulating number of presentations in their Experiment 3.  Experiment 2 
reports a faithful replication of this finding as well.  Experiment 3 generalizes 
this memory-for-foils effect from the levels-of-processing manipulation used 
previously to a novel imagery encoding manipulation.  Words that people did 
not intend to learn nevertheless benefited on a later memory test when they 
were experienced among other, previously elaborated, words; we now know that 
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this occurs using two of the most widely studied modes of elaboration:  levels-
of-processing and imagery.   
Whereas the levels-of-processing mode is based on the degree of 
semantic—as opposed to perceptual—processing, the elaboration brought about 
by imagery as an encoding mode certainly appears to have a different basis.  
Imagery is not equivalent to semantic processing, invoking as it does perceptual 
elements of what is imaged (see Paivio, 1971, 1995, 2007).  But imagery is a 
coherent mode of processing in the same sense that deep semantic processing 
is:  Both are readily engaged—and re-engaged—ways of thinking about what is 
presented.  This is why I reasoned that deep versus shallow imagery should 
also be capable of inducing and re-inducing differential modes of processing.  
When this same study was extended, in Experiment 5, to include a 
judgment regarding the quality of the memories for the foils in the final 
recognition test, the results demonstrated that more detail-based memories 
accompanied ―deep‖ foils than ―shallow‖ foils during that test. This study was a 
stepping stone to providing direct evidence for the interaction between encoding 
and retrieval processes. Indeed, while participants were undergoing retrieval 
processing for old, deep items in the first test, new items were concurrently 
being encoded with more details than would be expected in the absence of a 
deep context associated during retrieval. Such detail-rich memories suggest a 
link between the depth of encoding of the old items and the way in which 
accompanying new items are encoded during the test. 
Experiment 6 fits the key piece to the puzzle, and as such is the 
centerpiece of the thesis.  Here, the question of whether it would be possible to 
obtain more direct behavioral evidence of re-entering the original encoding 
mode was addressed.  If, during Test 1, the foils are re-processed with respect 
to the original mode of processing of the accompanying targets, then that 
should be evident when the foils subsequently must be processed in terms of 
that original mode.  To test this hypothesis, Experiment 6b ended not with a 
recognition test but with the same judgment task that was used during study.  
By showing that people were faster to respond on a pleasantness judgment task 
to foils from the test of deeply encoded words, Experiment 6b demonstrated 
that these words were encoded within that same deep context.  Further, we 
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know from Experiment 6a that this benefit for ―deep‖ foils is not due to a 
general processing benefit for items associated with deeply encoded words but, 
instead, only occurs within the context of the original encoding task. Therefore, 
during retrieval, participants do appear to re-enact the encoding task.  
What seems to be essential to benefit memory for the foils is that 
encoding involves differentiable modes of processing being applied to the two 
sets of words during study, and that the reinstatement of these same modes of 
processing—separately—be accomplished at the time of the first recognition 
test.  If both conditions are met, and if encoding was initially done more 
elaborately, then the foils also receive more elaborative encoding—the same 
more elaborative encoding—and are better remembered.  In the framing of 
Jacoby et al. (2005a), the beneficial encoding mode is reinstated on the first 
recognition test, in accordance with the transfer appropriate processing 
principle (Morris et al., 1977; Roediger, 1990).  This is what Jacoby et al. 
referred to as ―source-constrained retrieval.‖ 
It appears, then, that we unintentionally process items on a second 
occasion in much the same way as we processed them on the first occasion, 
even without any explicit requirement to do so.  This is not surprising:  It is in 
accord with the idea of transfer appropriate processing (Morris et al., 1977), 
which shows that retrieval is best when the processes engaged during retrieval 
match those that were engaged during encoding. This phenomenon certainly 
meshes well with the proceduralist view of memory (Kolers, 1973; Kolers & 
Roediger, 1984) where memory is conceived more as a byproduct of processing 
during encoding and retrieval.  In this view, it is actually the process of how 
things are put into and taken out of ‗memory‘ that is most important rather 
than the intention to do so (see also Craik, 1983). 
It is worth noting, however, that the benefit of transfer appropriate 
processing stems from processing during study, whereas the benefit of source-
constrained retrieval results from reprocessing of items during test. Such 
processing reinstatement optimizes retrieval success when it provides a 
coherent encoding mode, ―spilling over‖ onto other items processed 
contiguously, even without any intention to learn them.  This highlights that 
there is indeed a mode of processing that is active across trials during retrieval.  
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This agrees with the proceduralist analysis that there is very substantial 
overlap of the processes involved in encoding and retrieval.  Instead of thinking 
of retrieval as separate and distinct from encoding, retrieval could more 
parsimoniously be regarded as another encoding event. 
Indeed, in Tulving and Thompson‘s (1973) concept of ―synergistic 
ecphory‖ as part of the encoding specificity principle, the type of retrieval cues 
that are specific to the encoded items are fundamental to the success of the 
memory retrieval. That is, there is more information available in memory at any 
given time than is accessible. Analogously to how forgetting can be caused by 
the lack of availability of appropriate cues, encoding can also benefit from the 
appropriate type of retrieval strategy. 
Even when more complex stimuli are used, as was the case in 
Experiment 4 using phrases, the memory-for-foils effect is still obtained. The 
amount of information contained within one sentence is compounded relative to 
words. It is rare that we have to remember words in isolation. Therefore, 
phrases are, therefore, complex stimuli that have increased applicability when 
considering the broader context of memory within our daily lives. Thus, 
encoding and retrieval processes do, in all likelihood, work together to aid in 
creating better, more highly associated memories outside of the context of the 
laboratory setting. Interestingly, the sentences in Experiment 4 were 
unrelated—the only link is that of the study manipulation (i.e., ―How believable 
is this statement?‖). Thus, even with a multitude of information, the way that it 
is stored (and therefore retrieved) has great consequences for new, incoming 
information.  
This thesis has demonstrated a link between encoding and retrieval 
processes:  The way that old items are retrieved has a direct and measurable 
influence on the success of encoding of new items.  The experiments have also 
shown that this influence is not restricted to a single mode of processing.  Re-
invoking the encoding processes (or modes) during retrieval permits all items on 
the recognition test (including the new items) to undergo that processing, with 
the same benefits to memory for the new items as were observed for the 
originally studied items.  The new items are thus encoded using a retrieval 
process that increases the likelihood of richer encoding, and produces 
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measurable facilitation in speed of subsequent processing.  Importantly, these 
results demonstrate that the mode of processing engaged during encoding, and 
reinstated during retrieval, has substantial effects on the encoding of new 
information, thereby helping to specify how encoding and retrieval are linked. 
This link is also starting to emerge in neuroimaging studies. While no 
neuroimaging results are presented here, my findings can be tied with recent 
evidence that some of the regions that are activated during encoding are re-
activated again at retrieval (Danker & Anderson, 2010; Nyberg, Habib, 
McIntosh, & Tulving, 2000; Nyberg, Petersson, Nilsson, Sandblom, Aberg, & 
Ingvar, 2001; Wheeler & Buckner, 2003; Woodruff, Johnson, Uncapher, & 
Rugg, 2005). Nyberg and colleagues (2000) associated words with sounds 
during encoding using PET. At retrieval, although only the words were 
presented, auditory brain regions were also active, suggesting that all aspects of 
the encoding experience were retrieved. Using fMRI, Skinner, Grady, & 
Fernandes (2010), also found reactivation during retrieval, this time in face-
related regions (i.e., the fusiform gyrus), for words that had been studied along 
side faces as compared to those that had not. Although this area needs further 
investigation, these studies support a strong link between encoding and 
retrieval processes.  
5.2 Potential Criticisms 
One might argue that these conclusions all derive from the context of a 
relatively specific set of parameters and a single paradigm, and consequently 
might not hold in a different context. However, changing the type of stimuli (i.e., 
words to phrases) and the type of study manipulation (i.e., semantic elaboration 
to imagery) provides support for the phenomenon‘s generalizability. But the 
question still might arise as to the role that this effect plays in everyday life.  
The argument in this thesis is that it is likely that there is a strong role for this 
type of interaction between encoding and retrieval in common memory 
problems. In addition to my earlier example of remembering a grocery list, we 
often use the context of encoding during attempts at retrieval, even for 
something as banal as remembering an actor‘s name: We first may go through 
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the movies in which they have appeared, in an effort to spur the memory for 
their name. 
With unintentional memories, encoding and retrieval are still likely to co-
operate such that incoming information is immediately linked to pre-existing 
information in memory. The ―butcher on the bus‖ phenomenon provides a 
salient example of this. This phenomenon (often credited to Mandler, 1980, but 
perhaps first broached by Osgood, 1953, p. 550), shows how encountering 
someone in an unexpected context results in difficulty recognizing that person, 
who otherwise would be easily recognized. Unintentionally encoded information 
(e.g., the butcher shop) is truly necessary to retrieve the memory of who the 
person is. This shows how important the context of encoding is to retrieval; 
retrieval is seriously impeded if its context does not align with the encoding 
context.  
Another potential criticism is the lack of finding of a shallow processing 
advantage in experiment 6b.  When words that had been in the shallow 
recognition test and words that had been in the deep recognition test both 
appeared on a shallow judgment task—the same one used during initial study—
the words from the shallow recognition test were not processed faster than 
those from the deep test. There are several potential explanations for this. One 
is that it is possible that the effect was smaller and harder to obtain with that 
task because the differences between items is much smaller (all drawn from a 
finite set of letters). Another possible reason is that when the encoding mode is 
not strong enough, retrieval plays a much smaller role during encoding; for 
items within a weak context, there may be an associated broader context (i.e., 
the lab session) but not something more specific (i.e., shallow processing).  My 
preferred explanation is simply that judging whether a word contains a 
particular letter is not an analysis likely to be replayed during subsequent 
testing—this task does not constitute a retrieval mode that can be re-enacted.  
A further criticism might pertain to the likelihood of the phenomenon of 
retrieval mode occurring within the context of everyday memories. I discuss this 
idea further below but, essentially, I argue that the more relevant question 
would be when it would not occur in the context of our everyday memories.   
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5.3 Future Directions 
One remaining question pertains to the expansion upon the question of 
applicability of the memory-for-foils effect. Are people likely to use it as a matter 
of course in their everyday lives? Is the context of retrieved items automatically 
associated with novel ones? For example, on multiple choice tasks used by so 
many university classes, are students actually integrating the novel (i.e., false) 
information when they have studied for the test using deep encoding 
techniques? If so, it seems that we are actually causing harm as well as good to 
the best students by increasing the amount of false information being 
incorporated into their memories of the course material. This would suggest 
that we should move away from this type of testing.  Indeed, there is some 
evidence in the literature on the testing effect—the benefits of testing—for 
exactly this sort of cost (see, e.g., Butler & Roediger, 2008; Roedgier & Marsh, 
2005; Marsh, Agarwal, & Roediger, 2009a). 
An important piece of the puzzle that still needs further investigation is 
that of neuroimaging evidence of an overlap between encoding and retrieval 
processes. As noted earlier, it is within this realm that the evidence for the 
separability of these processes has been emphasized. While there is some 
emerging evidence for such an overlap (Danker & Anderson, 2010; Nyberg et 
al., 2000; Nyberg et al., 2001; Wheeler & Buckner, 2003; Woodruff et al., 2005), 
I believe that, in the context of neuroimaging, the memory-for-foils paradigm 
could be a very suitable tool for addressing this question. If, for example, we 
were to find the same areas to be activated during the original encoding session 
as for the foils within the first test, it would be convincing evidence for a role for 
both processes occurring during the test, especially because the study 
manipulation and the test place very different requirements on the participants. 
In particular, activation would be expected in areas involved in visual imagery 
(i.e., the prefrontal cortex, parahippocampal cortex and occipital regions; 
Johnson & Rugg, 2007). In addition to the use of the memory-for-foils 
paradigm, it is important to use newer analyses that allow us not only to 
investigate singular areas of activation, but also to discover areas that work 
together within the network, thereby providing a possible missing link. Prior 
research has faced difficulty in designing a study that would offer such a clear 
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overlap between retrieval and encoding, which has made drawing any 
conclusions about their interactive nature more difficult.  
Another question that remains is whether the depth of encoding needs to 
be associated with the study items directly or whether that depth—that mode—
could somehow be induced during the test, if that would provide the same 
benefits as seen with the memory-for-foils paradigm. For example, if all study 
items could be categorized in a way that would not be obvious during study, if 
that categorization was then provided prior to the test, would the new foils still 
be linked? Other contextual dimensions such as physical location and mood for 
the separate lists could also speak to the issue of what type of context plays a 
role.  
As with many other memory phenomena (for example, see McConkie & 
Currie, 1996; Simons & Chabris, 1999), attention is likely a necessary 
component. We know that the relation between encoding and retrieval on a 
levels-of-processing task can be interrupted when attention is divided, 
especially during encoding (Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; 
Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Gavrilescu, & Anderson, 2000). Division of attention 
during the memory-for-foils paradigm has yet to be tested, but this would make 
an interesting next step, particularly were attention to be divided during the 
first recognition test, potentially preventing the implementation of a retrieval 
mode during the test, and thereby reducing or eliminating the memory-for-foils 
effect.  
Within the studies reported here, I have demonstrated a powerful—and 
very specific—influence of retrieval on encoding processing. An important next 
step would be to expand upon the converse effect—the effect of encoding on 
retrieval. In addition to transfer-appropriate processing, there is some evidence 
that this influence does occurs, given that the way in which we encode things 
has a powerful effect on how well items are later retrieved (e.g., levels of 
processing, Craik & Lockhart, 1972; and remember/know; Gardiner, 1988; 
Rajaram, 1993). Moreover, the generation effect—where items that are 
generated from clues are better remembered than those that are simply read 
(Slamecka & Graf, 1978; Bertsch, Pesta, Wiscott, & McDaniel, 2007)—suggests 
a strong role for retrieval in successful encoding.  It also could likely be shown 
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that retrieval is impaired based on a conflicting encoding manipulation, 
supporting the notion that the two processes work together.  
5.4 Conclusions 
Within the context of the memory-for-foils paradigm, the empirical work 
in this thesis has demonstrated a very intimate link between encoding and 
retrieval processes. The existence of this link argues for a fundamental shift in 
the way that the processes are conceived and studied, as Hintzman (2011) has 
recently convincingly contended, writing that there are ―two implicit 
assumptions that are false:  that retrieval does not occur during the study 
phase, and that encoding does not occur during the test phase‖ (p. 256). 
Creating artificial divisions between encoding and retrieval leads to less than 
ideal perceptions of the processes. To truly understand memory as a whole, the 
way in which these sub-processes function together is, I believe, the more 
fundamental question. As part of one larger process, encoding and retrieval 
work together to build an efficient and effective memory system—one in which 
memories are well organized and, thus, easily accessible. We know that 
memories are never perfect replicas of past events, but rather, are 
reconstructed or recreated (Bartlett, 1932). Therefore, it is part of the 
fundamental process that new memories are integrated well not only with the 
appropriate external context, but also into our existing personal memories. This 
integration acts to strengthen the memories and increase their value because 
they can provide some extra context and meaning. Without this, nothing would 
be linked and learning would be very difficult indeed.  
In considering the usefulness of encoding/retrieval interactions, there 
appears to be a very powerful and useful mnemonic that is not commonly 
suggested but that could perhaps benefit people were they encouraged to use it. 
If people are instructed directly to try to retrieve each item by repeating the 
study manipulation on them, this would benefit not only memory for those 
items, but additionally memory for the co-occurring novel items. This is only 
one potential positive outcome for this link between encoding and retrieval but, 
regardless, this link could have many important ramifications with respect to 
the way that we conceptualize memory and study it.  
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Memory processes hold a great deal of fascination for many researchers 
with the goal of understanding human cognition, myself included. But much of 
society gives these processes little thought until they fail to function. There is so 
much complexity when thinking about how we encode and retrieve memories 
within behavioural studies of cognition alone, without even brushing the edges 
of the neuroscientific realm. Every new piece of the puzzle continues to bring 
with it more questions. Despite the common colloquialisms about memory that 
refer to encoding and retrieval as separate, they clearly are not.  It is the 
personal integration of events across our present and our past that makes the 
processes that underlie our understanding of the world truly fascinating—and 
extremely elusive.  The principal argument in this thesis is that we can only 
understand our own memory processes if we view them as interdependent, and 
stop treating them as isolated from each other.  To learn is to remember; to 
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APPENDIX A 
The most stolen car in Canada is the 2000 Honda Civic. 
Spermology is the study or collection of trivia. 
Coffee is the world's most popular beverage. 
The hottest chili in the world is the habanero. 
A cluster of bananas is called a hand. 
Bats are the only mammal that can fly. 
The average life span of a mosquito is two weeks. 
Ants do not sleep. 
Amelia Earhart was the second person to fly solo across the Atlantic. 
The opposite of a "vacuum" is a "plenum." 
Naples is the place of origin of pizza, guitars and mandolins. 
Adding milk to tea negates its health effects. 
VHS stands for Video Home System. 
The Hope Diamond was mined in India. 
The Silk Road runs from China to Turkey. 
India ink is not from India - it's from China and Egypt. 
There are 1,792 steps in the Eiffel Tower. 
Cloudy apple juice is healthier than clear juice. 
A prairie oyster is actually a calf's testicle. 
Racism is a crime in Brazil. 
Some roaches can fly. 
An octopus has three hearts. 
A firefly is not a fly; it's a beetle. 
Paper products make up approximately 40 percent of all trash. 
Sony started as the maker of rice cookers. 
Matthew means "Gift from God." 
People of Monaco are called Monegasques. 
The average NFL career lasts about 3½ years. 
A house mouse feeds 15 to 20 times per day. 
Dom Perignon was a Benedictine monk. 
Whales have no vocal cords, but they can sing. 
The Latin words for apple and evil are the same: malus. 
There are more pyramids in Sudan than in Egypt. 
A leapling is a person born on February 29th. 
